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December 6, 1993

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William F. Caton, Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. - Room 222 Washington, D.C. 20554

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Re: PP Docket No. 93-253 Competitive Bidding

Dear Mr. Caton:

On December 6, 1993, E.Y. Snowden and Jim Tuthill, from Pacific Bell, and Paul Milgrom of Cornerstone Research met with Robert Pepper, David Reed, Evan Kwerel, John Williams, Jonathan Levy and Marc Martin of the Office of Plans and Policy, Tom Stanley and David Siddall of the Officer of Engineering and Technology, Kent Nakamura of the Private Radio Bureau, Jonathan Cohen and Jim Coltharp regarding several issues in the subject proceeding. They distributed the attached written material.

I am filing two copies of this letter and its attachment in accordance with Section 1.1206(a) of the Commission's rules. Please contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter.

Sincerely,

Attachment

CC (w/o attachment):
David Reed

David Reed
Evan Kwerel
John Williams
Jonathan Levy
Marc Martin
Tom Stanley
David Siddall
Jonathan Cohen
Jim Coltharp
Kent Nakamura

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Ex Parte Presentation

by Paul Milgrom for Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell December 6, 1993

Contents

Major Design Points. We reaffirm our written positions that (1) a simultaneous ascending bid auction, in which bidding on all broadband PCS licenses closes together or nearly so, is superior to a sequence of auctions, (2) combinatorial bidding is unnecessary and should not be allowed, and (3) the pace of the auction should be slow enough to allow bidders to deliberate during the course of the auction.

Worst-Case Timing for the Milgrom-Wilson Design. We analyze the Milgrom-Wilson design to evaluate the pace of the auction and the time necessary for completion.

Spreadsheet Program. These pages illustrate the logic and output of a working MacIntosh Excel spreadsheet that implements our proposed auction design.


Major Design Points

- Simultaneous auctions with bids not more often than once per day are superior to sequential auctions because they...
 - entail less guesswork by bidders and make efficient allocations more likely
 - develop information about values during the course of the auction, alleviating the winner's curse
 - allow bidders to evaluate and pursue backup strategies during the course of the auction
 - are much less subject to strategic manipulation
- Combinatorial bidding should not be allowed because...
 - full combinatorial bidding is non-transparent and cannot be implemented reliably
 - limited combinatorial bidders unfairly get "two bites at the apple"
 - the various proposed forms of combinatorial bidding entail predictable inefficiencies or inequities, or both
 - simultaneous auctions promote efficiency without combinatorial bids.
- The pace of the auction should be deliberate because...
 - large financial stakes require close supervision by bidders' financial officers and boards of directors
 - complexity of valuing combinations of licenses require real-time planning by professional staffs
 - bidders' problems in participating in a fast-paced auction would result in less efficient allocations, more aftermarket trading, and lower prices


Worst-Case Timing in the Milgrom-Wilson Design

- Let T be the total spectrum available for bidding, measured in MHz-POPs. Let E be the total current eligibility of the bidders in MHz-POPs. Define e = E/T to be the *eligibility ratio*.
- The fraction of activity accounted for by new bids in each round cannot be less than 1 − 3/e during phase I, 1 − 1.5/e during phase II, or 1 − 1/e during phase III.
- A conservative version of the activity rule designed to avoid worst-case delays might entail minimum bid increments of x per MHz-POP and a phase-change rule that prescribes changes when the total highest bids rise by less than, say, \$100 million per round.
 - The activity rule guarantees a minimum level of new bidding activity at each round while the eligibility ratio *e* remains high.
 - The minimum bid increment x ensures that this new bidding activity translates into genuine progression of bids within the phase.
 - The phase change rule advances the pace as *e* falls and also ensures that, on almost every day until phase III, total bids increase by at least \$100 million.
 - The sealed bid closing rule brings the auction to a smooth close late in stage III in case bidding remains active on only a few low-value licenses and total bids have ceased to progress.


Overview of a Single Round of Bidding Using Spreadsheet Software




PCS Spectrum Auction Software




CHECKING BID SUBMISSION




Integrating New Bids and Generating Official Report




THE OFFICIAL DAILY REPORT




AMERICAN COMM. BIDDING SHEET



CHECK TEMPLATE



ELIGIBILITY SHEET



FCC's MAIN SHEET

